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Abstract
In a representative democracy, voters can use elections to protect their
property by holding politicians accountable for the tax policies they im-
plement while in oﬃce. This paper demonstrates that performance voting
can — partly or wholly — solve the capital levy problem. We characterize
the “best” non-expropriating tax policies that can be sustained in a sta-
tionary Markov Perfect Equilibrium; show when this coincides with the
second best tax policy; and discuss, in detail, the robustness of the result.
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1 Introduction
This paper shows that performance voting in a representative democracy can
— partly or wholly — solve the capital levy problem.4 We imagine a society
in which voters elect (and reelect) politicians, who implement policies on their
behalf, using the majority rule. This takes place in a sequence two-candidate
elections where the incumbent runs against a challenger. Politicians are unable
to commit themselves to a particular policy plan at the time of election. Voters
and, more generally, decision makers in the private sector, therefore, expect
politicians to pursue their own interests once in oﬃce and, without further
incentives, to expropriate all capital. Voters can provide incentives by holding
the politician accountable at election times for past behavior. In particular,
they can elect politicians on the understanding that they will not be reelected
unless they perform up to a certain, pre-specified standard, as first suggested
by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). As long as politicians care about holding
1We would like to thank ESRC for financial support (grant no. L138251006), and Jayasri
Dutta, Martin Daunton, Ernesto Dal Bo, Geoﬀrey Brennan, Michel Guillard, Philipp Harms,
Anke Kessler, Arye Hillman, Vania Sena, Leslie Reinhorn, and Miltadis Makris for helpful
comments and suggestions. We have also benefitted from comments made by participants in
seminars at University of Birmingham, the EPCS’s 2001 meeting in Paris, the 2001 CEME
General Equilibrium Conference at Brown University, Seminaire “Dynamique et anticipations”
DELTA (CNRS-EHESS-ENS), the 10th Silvaplana Workshop on Political Economy, 2001, and
the May 2002 Conference of the Public Economics Work Group, University of Warwick.
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335231. E-mail: toke.aidt@econ.cam.ac.uk.
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political oﬃce in the future, elections can serve as an implicit incentive contract
and, at least partly, eliminate the capital levy problem.
We evaluate the force of this argument formally in a simple model of capital
taxation. In the model, the politician has an incentive to tax capital heavily
after investments have been sunk in order to increase the provision of a public
good. Households realize this ex ante and reduce investments to ineﬃciently
low levels. Since the households are also voters, they can use their political
voice to protect themselves against expropriation, as discussed above. We show
(Proposition 2) that voters by employing the (constrained) eﬃcient stationary
voting strategy can move the economy away from the third best (complete
expropriation of capital) toward the second best tax policy, and sometimes even
sustain the second best tax policy as an equilibrium outcome.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a
brief literature review and relate our work to the existing literature. In section
3, we develop a simple model of capital taxation. The model has the minimum
properties needed to formalize our argument and is chosen for transparency. As
a benchmark, we show (Proposition 1) that a politician with life-time tenure
and the power to commit to specific tax rates would want to tax capital but not
expropriate it completely. Without commitment power, the politician wants
to expropriate the existing stock of capital completely with disastrous conse-
quences for social welfare. In section 4, we allow voters to use elections to
protect themselves against expropriation. They set performance standards that
terminate the tenure of a politician if he performs below expectations. We char-
acterize the “best” capital tax rate that can be sustained by simple stationary
voting strategies in Proposition 2. This result can best be understood as an
upper bound on what electoral accountability can achieve in a representative
democracy, as it is based on a number of critical assumptions, including that
voters can coordinate their voting strategies and that politicians are perfect
substitutes. In section 5, we introduce heterogenous voters and politicians, and
show that electoral accountability can still provide a (partial) solution to the
capital levy problem, although the force of the argument is weakened. In section
6, we discuss some empirical implications of our model.
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2 The Literature
Following Kydland and Prescott (1977), a substantial literature has investigated
how societies can and do deal with problems of time inconsistency.5 Before turn-
ing to the formal analysis, we briefly relate our paper to the relevant branches
of this literature. First, the fact that democratic institutions can mitigate time
inconsistency problems has been pointed out previously in the literature. To our
knowledge, however, this paper is the first to analyze the role played by perfor-
mance voting and electoral accountability. Persson and Tabellini (1994) show
that strategic delegation in a representative democracy can provide a solution
to the capital levy problem in a two-period median voter model. They show
that the median voter wants to delegate decision making power to a “conserv-
ative” politician because it provides insurance against expropriation of capital.
The logic is appealing. In the period between elections, the median voter cannot
change her mind. Accordingly, once a representative is elected, the median voter
is “committed” to accept whatever policy the representative implements. By
electing a representative with a stronger dislike for capital taxation than herself,
the median voter can (under certain circumstances) insure that the capital tax
implemented by representative after investments are sunk corresponds to the
capital tax that she herself would have liked to commit to (if she could) before
investments are sunk.6
While our model is also based on the notion that voters delegate decisions
to politicians, the role of delegation is fundamentally diﬀerent. In our model,
voters use elections to hold politicians accountable for their policy choices. The
election is similar to an implicit incentive contract, and voting is based on past
performance. This mechanism is eﬀective in preventing expropriation when
politicians value public oﬃce and the future. Hence, rather than delegating
decisions to an representative with a stronger dislike for expropriation (than
the median), voters, in our model, exploit the fact that politicians like to be
reelected; that is, it is the fact that politicians once elected enjoy being in
power that is the driving force. In our model, this simple mechanism provides
a (partial) solution to the capital levy problem. As shown by Persson and
Tabellini (2000, chapter 4 and 9), a similar logic applies in a range of other public
5 See Drazen (2000, chapter 4 and 5) or Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 12) for surveys.
6 It is clear, as pointed out by Persson and Tabellini (1994), that this mechanism only works
if all investments are made after the election.
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finance problems. In particular, voters can reduce wasteful public spending, i.e.,
spending that benefits politicians at the expense of the electorate, by making
the right to collect such rents in the future (reelection) contingent on a reduction
in current wasteful spending. In contract, Coate and Morris (1999) provide an
example in which the electoral accountability mechanism may not be suﬃciently
strong to prevent ineﬃcient policy programs to persist once they have been
implemented (with the consent of the electorate).
Garfinkel and Lee (2000) analyze the role of lobby groups in solving the
capital levy problem. They argue that individuals with a high stake in capital
taxation have an incentive to form lobby groups in order to protect themselves
against high capital taxes. The lobby groups “bribe” the government to tax
capital more lightly by providing, say, campaign finance. This mechanism can
partly solve the capital levy problem. Our model shares the idea that the
potential victims take political action to prevent expropriation. However, in
our model, the potential victims voice their concern via democratic elections,
while in Garfinkel and Lee’s model lobbying activities is what provide voice.
Garfinkel and Lee use the common agency model — developed by Bernheim and
Whinston (1986) — to show their point. This implies that they assume that the
lobby groups can commit to particular contribution functions and promise to pay
specific sums of money depending on the policy being implemented. Without
exogenous commitment power these contribution schedules are, however, not
time consistent: once the politician has implemented a policy, the lobby groups
have an incentive not to pay the promised reward.
Second, our paper also builds on ideas developed in the literature on incen-
tive contracts for central banks (Walsh, 1995). This literature analyses how
politicians can provide incentives for central bankers by means of an appropri-
ately designed wage contract and/or a dismissal rule. The literature has been
criticized by McCallum (1995) and Jensen (1997) for relocating the commitment
problem rather than solving it. This critique is also relevant to our model — and
to the literature on performance voting more generally. However, as long as
voters can readily find a perfect substitute for the incumbent politician, they
cannot do better than judging the observed policy implementation according to
the announced voting rule. Therefore, our solution to the capital levy problem
only requires that voters have a minimum of commitment power: if indiﬀerent,
they do what they promised to do. It is clear, however, that the assumption
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of perfect substitutes is critical: when such substitutes are not available, voters
would need some means of committing to particular voting strategies or other-
wise making them credible in order to control politicians eﬀectively. We discuss
this issue in more detail in section 5.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on repeated games and folk
theorems. Chari and Kehoe (1990) consider a society that is ruled by a benevo-
lent politician with life-time tenure, and show how the use of history dependent
policy and allocation plans can help sustain non-expropriating capital tax poli-
cies, including, if the discount factor is suﬃciently large, the Ramsey rule. The
point is that the politician wants to preserve his reputation for not expropriating
capital. Investors exploit this by letting the politician understand that they will
stop investing if they observe expropriation. One might interpret this as saying
that even societies that are ruled by a dictator or a king can avoid expropriation
and sustain the rule of law — if the dictator or king is farsighted enough. Our
approach is diﬀerent. From a conceptual point of view, we focus on the role of
accountability in a democracy rather than on the reputation mechanism. We
restrict attention to Markov strategies, and do not allow voters to base the per-
formance standard or investors to base their expectations on payoﬀ irrelevant
parts of the history of the game.7 Instead, we allow voters to punish politi-
cians by throwing them out of oﬃce and this is what sustains non-expropriating
capital tax policies. In reality, both the accountability and the reputation mech-
anism are likely to play a role, and they should be viewed as complements. It is
intriguing, moreover, to notice the similarities in results. The reputation mech-
anism is more likely to support the second best tax policy when the discount
rate is close to one, but, for a given discount rate, the greater “the value of not
being punished”, the greater the likelihood that the second-best outcome can be
sustained in equilibrium. In our model, the eﬃcient equilibrium has the same
flavor: while a high discount rate makes electoral accountability more eﬀective,
it can still work in societies where politicians do not value the future much, as
long as they value political oﬃce suﬃciently.
7 It is clear, however, that the reputation mechanism does work within the structure of our
model.
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3 The Economic Model
We consider an economy that is populated by a continuum of identical, infinitely-
lived households with measure 1. The economy has two productive sectors. The
C-sector is perfectly competitive and produces a consumption good (yt). The
consumption good can be used for private (ct) or public (gt) consumption. The
consumption good is produced by means of a linear technology using human
capital (ht) accumulated by households in the previous period as the only input.
That is,
yt = Rht−1, (1)
where R > 0 is the (constant) marginal product of (human) capital. The I-
sector is a household sector that produces human capital by means of a linear
(private) technology using eﬀort (et) as the only input. In each period, the
investment in human capital is
It = et. (2)
We assume that human capital depreciates fully after one period (ht = It). That
is, each new generation of a particular household dynasty needs to accumulate
its own human capital. The initial stock of capital, h−1, is zero.
In period t, each household rents its human capital to firms and receives
(capital) income, Rht−1, in return. The government can tax capital income and
use the revenue to provide public goods. We restrict attention to a proportional
tax, τ t ∈ [0, 1] and so, there are no non-distortionary means of raising revenue.
After-tax capital income, (1− τ t)Rht−1, is spent on private consumption:
ct = (1− τ t)Rht−1. (3)
The tax revenue, τ tRht−1, is used, by the government, to produce public goods
(gt):
gt = τ tRht−1. (4)
The public good is consumed by all households as available. Each household
derives utility from private and public goods, and disutility from putting in
eﬀort in the accumulation of human capital. The per-period utility function is
u(ct, gt, et) = ct −
e1+χt
(1 + χ) + γgt, (5)
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where χ > 1 is the elasticity of disutility with respect to eﬀort and γ indicates the
importance of public consumption relative to private consumption. We assume
that γ > 1. This implies that households prefer the public to the private good
and provides the rational for appointing a politician to produce gt.8
For a given sequence of actual and expected taxes, {τ t}∞t=1 and {τet}∞t=1,
each household maximizes
P∞
t=0 β
tu(ct, gt, et), where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor, subject to the constraints given by equations (2), (3) and (ct, ht, et) ≥ 0
for all t. The solution to this optimization problem is
ct(τ t, τet) = R (1− τ t) [βR (1− τet)]
1
χ for t = 1, 2, ...; (6)
et(τet+1) =
£
βR
¡
1− τet+1
¢¤ 1
χ for t = 0, 1, 2, .... (7)
The associated level of public consumption follows from equation (4) and is
equal to9
gt(τ t, τet ) = τ tR [βR (1− τet )]
1
χ for t = 1, 2, .... (8)
It is convenient to define the following policy preference function:
U(τ t, τet ) ≡ u(τ t, τet )−
et−1(τet )1+χ
β(1 + χ) , (9)
where
u(τ t, τet ) ≡ ct(τ t, τet ) + γgt(τ t, τet). (10)
The function U(τ t, τet ) shows how the utility of a household is aﬀected by the
actual tax rate in period t and the tax rate expected at time t− 1 to prevail in
period t. The latter determines the eﬀort invested in human capital in period
t−1 and so, the tax base in period t (see equation (7)). It is important to notice
that the two-sector structure of the model in conjunction with the assumption
of full depreciation imply that the model can be analyzed as a sequence of
two-period models.
Before we turn to the analysis of capital taxation and electoral accountabil-
ity, we characterize, as a benchmark, the tax policy chosen by a politician with
life-time tenure i) when he can commit (the second best) and ii) when he can-
8 If γ ≤ 1, the politician has no incentive to tax capital to provide public goods, and the
capital levy problem does not arise.
9Notice that c0 = g0 = 0 because h−1 = 0.
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not commit (the third best) to a particular tax policy.10 The objective of the
politician is to maximize the welfare of a representative household.
Proposition 1 Let γ > 1. For t = 1, 2, ..., the second (τsb) and third best tax
policy (τ tb) are stationary, and given by
τsb = (γ − 1)χ
(γ − 1)χ+ γ ∈ (0, 1) . (11)
τ tb = 1. (12)
Proof. See Appendix
In the (unrealistic) case where the politician can commit tax policy, the (sec-
ond best) tax rate is positive, but less than one. The politician trades oﬀ the
negative eﬀect of capital taxation on investments with the welfare gain associ-
ated with higher public consumption. The second best tax rate is increasing in
the valuation of public consumption (γ). As γ tends to 1+, τsb tends to zero and
when γ goes to infinite, τsb goes to χ/ (1 + χ) — the value of τ that maximizes
per-period tax revenue.
Lack of commitment power has disastrous consequences for economic welfare
as an expropriating, third best capital tax (τ tb = 1) is being levied. This is the
capital levy problem: after the private sector has undertaken its investments,
taxing the capital stock is no longer distortionary and so, the politician has
an incentive (for γ > 1) to increase the tax on capital income to augment the
supply of public consumption. Realizing this incentive ex ante, the private sector
reduces its investment to ineﬃciently low levels (et = 0) and ct = gt = 0 for all
t. Welfare is reduced from W (τsb) =
P∞
t=1 β
tU
¡
τsb, τsb
¢
> 0 to zero.
4 The Political Model
In most modern democracies, capital and wealth taxes are relatively modest,
although there is considerable variation among countries and over time.11 This
suggests that democratic institutions in various ways resolve the capital levy
problem. Below we study the role played by performance voting in this process.
10 If lump-sum taxation were possible, then (for γ > 1) the first best allocation would be
cfbt = 0, l
fb
t = (γβR)
1
χ , and gt = γ
1
χ (βR)
1+χ
χ .
11 See, Sandford (2000, chapter 6). Dutta et al. (1998) and Hettich and Winer (1999,
chapter 9) analyze the political economy of recent changes in capital taxation in the UK and
the U.S., respectively.
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4.1 Performance Voting
The theory of performance voting was originally developed by Barro (1973)
and Ferejohn (1986) and builds on two key assumptions.12 First, voters dele-
gate decision making power to politicians, who cannot commit to policy actions
at election times, and attempt to protect themselves against expropriation by
holding politicians accountable for what they do while in oﬃce. Formally, there
is an election each period. In these elections, the incumbent politician runs
against a challenger, and the majority rule determines whether the incumbent
is reelected for another term. To hold politicians accountable, voters set a per-
formance standard, τst , immediately after the election in period t−1, and let the
newly elected (or reelected) politician understand that he is only reelected in the
election held in period t if he implements a policy, τ It , that is found satisfactory
compared to the standard.
Second, politicians care about holding oﬃce. They do so for many reasons.
Here, we focus on one particular reason, namely that politicians like power for
its own sake — a factor that we call m for megalomania and refer to as the ego
rent. In addition, we assume that an elected politician continues his private
sector activities while in oﬃce.13 A politician’s per-period utility is thus given
by
m+ u(τ t, τet )−
et(τet+1)1+χ
1 + χ . (13)
It is clear that the ego rent gives the politician a desire to be re-elected, and
this is what allows voters to influence policy choices. Although m is likely to
vary across individuals, we shall retain, for now, the assumption that m is the
same for all individuals, but return to the issue of heterogenous politicians in
section 5. Politicians discount the future at the same rate as households.
We can now define the game between an elected politician and voters more
precisely. Politicians are drawn from the pool of households. A voting strategy is
a performance standard τst ∈ [0, 1] and a vote function, η(τIt , τst ), that indicates
whether (η(.) = 1) or not (η(.) = 0) the incumbent is reelected. An implemen-
12The idea that voters hold politicians accountable for actions taken while in oﬃce has
received considerable empirical support (see, e.g., Lewis-Beck, 1988; Nannestad and Paldam,
1994)
13 If we think of the unit of analysis as a household, then this basically means that the
politician continues to care about the welfare of the household to which he belongs after
having entered political oﬃce.
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Figure 1: The timing of events
tation strategy of the incumbent is a policy rule that maps every performance
standard into a policy implementation (τ It ).
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning of period t,
the incumbent politician implements a policy (τ It ).14 This is observed by voters
who in the upcoming election compare the implemented policy with the perfor-
mance standard set after the previous election (τst). If the politician satisfies the
requirements, he is reelected; otherwise, the challenger enters oﬃce.15 Immedi-
ately after the election in period t, the performance standard for the election to
take place in period t+1 is set and announced publicly. Next, households form
expectations about the policy to be implemented at the beginning of period
t + 1 (τet+1) and undertake investments in human capital accordingly (et). At
the beginning of period t+1, the elected politician implements the policy, τ It+1,
and a new election is held where voters hold the politician accountable for his
policy choice according to the standard τst+1. After that the sequence of events
repeats itself.
14Except in period 0 and so the first politician is elected without a record.
15Challengers play no active role in the election. They are important only because they
serve as (perfect) substitutes for the incumbent. The value of political oﬃce is suﬃciently
high to ensure a positive supply of oﬃce-seeking challengers whenever m > 0.
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4.2 Political Equilibrium
We define political equilibrium as Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the game de-
scribed above. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium path is a sequence of capital tax
implementations, performance standards, and voting outcomes which are best
responses to each other. Our model has many Markov Perfect Equilibria — some
of which are better for society than others. In Proposition 2, we characterize the
“best” tax rate that can be supported by a stationary Markov Perfect Equilib-
rium and identify when this might coincide with the second best tax policy. This
result can best be thought of as the upper boundary of what can be achieved
in terms of eliminating the capital levy problem by electoral accountability in a
representative democracy.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium with performance voting) The following voting and
implementation strategies can be sustained by a stationary Markov Perfect equi-
librium. The voting strategy is
η(τ , τs) = 1 iﬀ τ ≤ τs, (14)
η(τ , τs) = 0 iﬀ τ > τs, (15)
where the performance standard (τs) is defined by
τs = max
½
τsb, argmin
τ
·
βm
1− β − φ(τ) = 0
¸¾
(16)
where φ(τ) ≡ u(1, τ) − u(τ , τ) is the temptation of the incumbent politician
to expropriate capital and βm1−β is the reelection reward. The implementation
strategy followed by the incumbent politician is
τ I = τs (17)
and the incumbent is reelected every period.
Proof. Suppose voters each period announce τs as defined by equation (16).
The payoﬀ to perpetual compliance (τ I = τs for all t) is
C∞ = u(τs, τs) +m+ β
∞X
i=0
βi (U (τs, τs) +m) . (18)
where we notice that households anticipate this outcome and invest accordingly.
The politician might want to deviate from τ I = τs. If so, he does it in his first
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term, knowing that he is not going to get reelected and that he will return
to the private sector after the next election where another politician, who is
expected to comply, enters oﬃce. The best deviation strategy is to expropriate
the existing capital stock (τ = 1) and so, the payoﬀ is
D = u(1, τs) +m+ β
∞X
i=0
βiU (τs, τs) . (19)
Notice that the households expect to see τs implemented during the (final)
term of the deviating politician and invest accordingly. Hence, any τ > τs is
unexpected. The incumbent will play according to the candidate equilibrium
strategy, i.e., τ I = τs every period, if for all t
C∞ ≥ D⇔
βm
1− β − φ(τ
s) ≥ 0, (20)
where φ(τs) ≡ u(1, τs) − u(τs, τs). With the additional assumption that the
politician complies if indiﬀerent this is necessary and suﬃcient. Using equations
(6) and (8), we find that φ(τs) = (γ − 1)β 1χ [R(1− τs)]1+
1
χ . We notice i)
φ(0) > 0; ii) φ(1) = 0; and iii) ∂φ(.)∂τ < 0 for all τ ∈ [0, 1].
Voters coordinate on the best possible performance standard subject to com-
pliance. Notice that the sequence of incentive compatibility constraints defined
by equation (20) are stationary. This implies that the constrained eﬃcient per-
formance can be found by solving the following problem:
max
τ∈[0,1]
U(τ , τ) (21)
subject to
φ(τs) ≤ βm
1− β . (22)
This is a well-defined concave programming problem and so, the Kuhn-Tucker
first order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient. The Lagrangian is
L = U(τ , τ) + λ
·
βm
1− β − φ(τ)
¸
, (23)
where λ is the Lagrange Multiplier. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (ignoring
non-negativity constraints) are
∂L
∂τ =
∂U(τ , τ)
∂τ − λ
∂φ(τ)
∂τ = 0, (24)
∂L
∂λ =
βm
1− β − φ(τ) ≥ 0, (25)
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∂L
∂λλ = 0. (26)
If λ = 0, it follows from equation (24) that
τs = τsb. (27)
If λ > 0, we notice that τs > τsb because ∂L∂τ |τsb= −λ∂φ(τ)∂τ > 0. Moreover, the
performance standard is designed to satisfy ∂L∂λ = 0 and so,
τs = argmin
τ
·
βm
1− β − φ(τ) = 0
¸
, (28)
where βm1−β > 0 ⇒ τs < 1. Combing equations (27) and (28) yields equation
(16).
Remark 1 It is important to notice that the performance standard identified in
the Proposition is credible in the sense that voters have no (strict) incentive to
change their minds after the policy has been implemented. This is because voters
are indiﬀerent between electing any two candidates. Thus, they can commit to
any re-election rule they like opening the door for a multiplicity of equilibria.
As is standard in the literature,16 we focus on the equilibrium that maximize
voters’ payoﬀ subject to compliance by the politician. It is the fact that investors
anticipate compliance that enables voters to improve upon the third best. This
construction thus embodies two critical assumptions. First, voters are assumed
to be able to coordinate on the best possible performance standard and, second,
it is credible to do so because politicians are perfect substitutes. Heterogeneity
among voters and politicians may therefore weaken the result. We investigate
this important issue in more detail in section 5.
Remark 2 The performance standard is defined on the policy, rather than on
voters’ utility. In our model there is a one-to-one correspondence between any
given policy-based standard and any given utility-based standard because the pol-
icy space is one-dimensional. The policy-based standard identified in the Propo-
sition thus has a corresponding utility-based standard. Under the maintained
assumptions of the model, voters can, as argued above, commit to any voting
strategy they like subject to compliance by the politician and so, they could, al-
ternatively, announce a “conservative” voting strategy saying that they would
16 See, for example, Coate and Morris (1995, p. 1226) or Persson and Tabellini (2000,
chapter 4).
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not reelect a politician who implements a policy that yields too much contem-
poraneous utility. The “best” such strategy would lead to a sequence of policy
implementations identical to the one identified in the Proposition.
The Proposition demonstrates that performance voting can, in principle,
prevent (complete) expropriation of capital whenever politicians value the fu-
ture (β > 0) and derive utility from being in power (m > 0), and can, un-
der certain circumstances, implement the second best tax policy. The intu-
ition is appealing. After each election, politicians face the temptation to ex-
propriate the existing capital stock, thereby exploiting the fact that invest-
ments are sunk. The temptation to expropriate capital is captured by the term
φ(τs) = (γ−1)β
1
χ [R(1− τs)]1+
1
χ . We notice that the temptation is large when
the performance standard is demanding (τs is low). This is because the house-
holds expect the standard to be implemented along the equilibrium path and
invest accordingly. Hence, the tougher the standard, the more there is to expro-
priate. The incumbent politician balances the temptation to expropriate against
the desire to be reelected and earn the ego rent in the future. The reelection
reward is captured by the term βm1−β . Voters exploit the politician’s desire to be
reelected to provide incentives and reduce the capital levy problem.
The design of the incentive scheme can most readily be understood by means
of Figure 2. The Figure shows the temptation to expropriate and the reelection
reward as a function of the performance standard for given m, β, R, and γ.
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The temptation to expropriate is a decreasing, convex function of τs while the
reelection reward does not depend on τs. The reelection reward is shown for
two values of m. Proposition 2 makes a distinction between two situations: one
in which the second best tax policy can be sustained as an equilibrium and one
in which it cannot be sustained and τs = τI ∈ (τsb, 1]. When the reelection
reward is large relative to the temptation to expropriate ( βm1−β ≥ φ(τsb)), voters
can safely ask the incumbent to implement the second best tax each period as he
will not find it worthwhile to sacrifice political oﬃce to expropriate the (second
best) capital stock. In Figure 2, the equilibrium is at point A and τ I = τs = τsb
and the politician earns a “rent” corresponding to βmA1−β − φ(τsb) > 0. We can
interpret this as a “folk theorem”: for given β > 0, a suﬃciently high valuation
of political oﬃce can sustain the second best tax policy as a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium. We notice that the second best can be reached when the discount
factor is low as long as politicians earn a suﬃciently large ego rent while in
oﬃce. It is nevertheless important to notice that β > 0 is necessary to obtain
any improvement upon the third best. If politicians do not value the future at
all, voters cannot use the accountability mechanism to promote eﬃcient policies.
To the extent that politicians belong to political parties or political dynasties
with a longer time horizon than individual politicians this and the related “last
period” can, however, be overcome (Alesina and Spear, 1988).
When, on the hand, the value of reelection is low relative to the temptation
( βm1−β < φ(τsb)), asking for τsb would backfire. The best voters can do under
these circumstances is to make sure that the standard is suﬃciently demanding
to make the incumbent (just) indiﬀerent between, on the one hand, satisfying
the standard and getting reelected and, on the other, expropriating the stock of
capital and losing oﬃce (φ(τs) = βm1−β ). In Figure 2, the equilibrium is at point
B and τ I = τsB > τsb. If voters ask for more than τsB, the incumbent politician
cannot resist the temptation to expropriate, households anticipate this and the
economy collapses to the third best. If, on the other hand, voters ask for less
than τsB, they leave a rent to the politician, and could increase their own welfare
by being more demanding.
It is clear from the discussion above that the ego rent — and more generally
the idea that politicians value political oﬃce — and the discount rate play key
roles in solving the capital levy problem. The “quality” of tax policy (as mea-
sured by how close the equilibrium policy is to the second best), however, also
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depends on the other fundamentals, γ, and R, of the model. To understand
the role played by these factors, consider the situation in which the second best
policy cannot be sustained in political equilibrium and so the equilibrium policy
is equal to
τs(R, γ;m,β) = 1−
" βm
1−β
(γ − 1)R1+ 1χβ 1χ
# χ
1+χ
> τsb. (29)
A high return to investment (R) makes it harder to control politicians and so
τs is increasing in R. This is simply because the capital stock available for
expropriation is larger and so the temptation to expropriate is greater. In terms
of Figure 2, an increase in R rotates φ(τs) up,17 and, starting at point B, the
political equilibrium moves to the right towards the third best, which is reached
as R → ∞. Although, it is harder to control politicians in societies in which
the return to capital is large, an increase in R still has a beneficial impact on
social welfare as the negative welfare eﬀect of a higher equilibrium tax rate is
more than oﬀset by the positive welfare eﬀect of greater productivity.
The valuation of public consumption (γ) aﬀects τs through two channels.
An increase in γ makes it harder for voters to control the politician because the
temptation to expropriate capital is larger. In terms of Figure 2, φ(τs) rotates
up, moving the political equilibrium closer to the third best. The second eﬀect
is that the second best tax itself increases. It is, therefore, not clear if the
diﬀerence between the equilibrium tax and the second best tax is reduced.
5 Heterogenous Agents
Our model is based on the assumption that voters and the pool of potential
politicians are (ex ante) identical.18 While this assumption is commonly em-
ployed in the literature on performance voting and seems sensible in our setting
insofar as avoiding expropriation is a widely shared goal among the electorate,
in reality, voters and politicians are not all identical. Heterogeneity among vot-
ers and politicians raises two issues. First, if voters have diﬀerent interests, it
may be diﬃcult for them to coordinate on a particular performance standard
17 Since φ(1) = 0 for all β > 0, γ > 1 and R > 0, changes in these variables rotates φ(.)
around (1, 0).
18 It is clear that ex post heterogeneity in the sense of Drazen (2000: pp. 14-15) is required
for the capital levy problem to arise in the first place.
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for judging politicians’ performance and the logic of competition may render it
impossible to control politicians eﬀectively. Second, heterogeneity in the pool
of (potential) politicians implies that voters would not, in general, be indiﬀer-
ent between politicians at the time of election, and their ability to commit to
a particular performance standard would be weakened. Moreover, in so far as
heterogeneity among voters implies heterogeneity among politicians, the two
issues are related.
To evaluate these critical issues more formally, we extend our basic model to
allow for heterogeneity. We do so by considering each aspect in isolation. The
analysis thus does not claim generality, but serves to illustrate that the basic
idea of the paper — that voters can use the democratic right to dismiss under-
performing politicians to (partly) solve the capital levy problem — has validity
also in more complex settings with heterogeneous agents.
5.1 Heterogenous Voters
Consider a society in which the population of voters can be divided into three
groups, indexed i ={L,M,H}, each with a 13 of the electorate as its member-
ship.19 The three groups have a diﬀerent preference for the public good. In
particular, we assume that 1 < γL < γM < γH . These diﬀerences imply that
each group has its “own” second best tax policy. A simple calculation, along
the lines of Proposition 1 yields, for t = 1, 2, .., that
0 < τsbL < τsbM < τsbH < 1. (30)
In contrast, all voters agree on what is the third best policy, namely τ tbi =
τ tb = 1 for all i. That is, despite the diﬀerence in the taste for public versus
private consumption, granted the power of government, all citizens would have
an incentive to expropriate the existing capital stock. Figure 3 shows the second
best tax policies for the three groups. We notice that tax rates in the interval
[τsbL , τsbH ] are Pareto eﬃcient, while for tax rates in either [0, τsbL ) or in (τsbH , 1] are
ineﬃcient: an increase or a decrease, respectively, would improve the welfare of
all groups.
To isolate the potential coordination problem among heterogenous voters
from the issue of heterogenous political candidates, we assume that politicians
are recruited from a particular group (the political elite). This ensures that
19The analysis can easily be extended to a arbitrary number of groups with varying size.
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Figure 3: The second best tax policy for the three groups of voters
challenges and incumbents are perfect substitutes. For concreteness, suppose
all political candidates are from group M , but this is not important for what
follows.20 We assume that voters within each group are able to coordinate their
voting strategies perfectly among themselves. It seems reasonable that (small)
groups of like-minded voters can do so, and that electoral competition then
takes place at the group level. After each election, each group announces a per-
formance standard of the following type: all members of group i vote in favor
of the incumbent (ηi(τ t, τsit) = 1) if and only if he implements a policy belong-
ing to [τsit, τsit]; otherwise, all members vote in favor of the challenger. Each
group wants to specify an lower as well as an upper bound on what constitutes
acceptable performance. The upper bound is required to avoid expropriation.
The lower bound is required because each group does not want to support tax
rates that are far below their second best.21
20An alternative, less ad hoc, assumption would be to introduce a “simple legislature,” as in
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1999), where each group elects (and reelects) a representative
separately. Importantly, each representative is recruited from a pool of identical candidates.
At the beginning of the game, an agenda setter is appointed among the elected candidates. He
gets to make a take-it-or leave-it policy proposal to the other candidates and needs a majority
to pass the proposal. If we assume that no taxes can be levied and the legislature is dissolved
if the proposal made by the agenda setter fails to command a majority, then the solution
discussed in the text corresponds to the situation in which the representative from group M
is chosen as the agenda setter of the simple legislature.
21When there is only one group of voters this is not a consideration. This is why we only
specify the upper bound in Proposition 2.
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The new feature is that the groups act strategically, and we must require
that the standards proposed by each group is a best response to the standards
proposed by the other groups (i.e., form a Nash equilibrium) taking into account
the best response of the politician. Households anticipate the equilibrium and
form expectations accordingly. Equilibrium then requires three things (Persson
and Tabellini, 2000, pp. 236-237). First, standards cannot be so demanding that
the politician wants to forego reelection; second, the equilibrium policy most be
optimal for the incumbent given that he has to satisfy the performance standards
of a majority only; third, no group of voters can benefit from a unilateral change
in its announced voting strategy. We look for a stationary Markov Perfect
Equilibrium.
Suppose that the groups announce the voting strategy
τ s = {(τsL, τsL), (τsM , τsM), (τsH , τsH)} (31)
at each election. The incumbent politician only needs the votes of two of the
three groups to get reelected (a minimum winning coalition). We know that
the incumbent politician has an incentive to expropriate, so, if he intents to get
reelected, he will pick the largest tax rate compatible with getting the votes of
at least two groups. Let τ∗ be the largest such tax rate.22 Then the payoﬀ of
perpetual compliance can be written as
CM∞ = uM(τ∗, τ∗) +m+ β
∞X
i=0
βi(UM(τ∗, τ∗) +m). (32)
If the politician deviates, he sets τ = 1 in the knowledge that reelection is going
to fail. His payoﬀ is
DM = uM(1, τ∗) +m+ β
∞X
i=0
βiUM(τ∗, τ∗). (33)
Notice that CM∞ ≥ DM ⇔ φ(τ∗) ≤ βm1−β . Hence, the best response of the
politician to the vector of performance standards τ s is
φM(τ∗) ≤ βm
1− β ⇒ τ
I = τ∗ (34)
22 τ∗ does not exist for arbitrary voting strategies. In particular, if the three intervals
announced by voters are disjoint, τ∗ would not exist, and the politician will surely implement
τ = 1. As we shall see below, this could not be an equilibrium, and, at equilibrium, the
intervals announced by voters are, indeed, overlapping ensuring the existence of a unique τ∗.
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φM(τ∗) > βm
1− β ⇒ τ
I = 1 (35)
The announced standards (τ s) must be a Nash equilibrium, anticipating the
best response of the politician. Define τ as the solution to φM(τ) = βm1−β .
Notice that τ is decreasing in m. We then get
Proposition 3 All capital tax rates in [τ , 1] can be sustained as stationary po-
litical equilibria. Moreover, there exists a m∗ such that for m ≥ m∗ some
sustainable tax rates are Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof. Consider the following strategies. Voters announce τsi < τsi i ∈
{L,M,H} and τsL = τsM = τsH = τ ∈ [τ , 1] in each period, and the politician
implements τ I = τ every period. If two groups play according to the proposed
strategy, the third group cannot deviate in any way that would induce the
politician to change the policy implementation. Hence, the voting strategies are
best responses to each other and the implementation strategy is a best response
to the voting strategies. Finally define m∗ as the solution to φM(τsbH) =
βm∗
1−β .
Note that φM(τ) = βm1−β ⇒
dτ
dm < 0. Therefore, for m ≥ m∗, we have τ ≤ τsbH .
This implies that [τ , 1]∩ [τsbL , τsbH ] is non-empty, i.e., some sustainable tax rates
are contained in the Pareto set
The proposition demonstrates the nature of the coordination problem that
arises when voters have diﬀerent preferences: all incentive compatible stan-
dards can be sustained as (stationary) Markov Perfect Equilibria. While the
third best is an equilibrium, it is important to notice that the three groups can
achieve better equilibrium outcomes. In particular, form ≥ m∗, Pareto eﬃcient
outcomes (i.e., tax rates in [τsbL , τsbH ]) can be sustained in political equilibrium.
Only if the ego-rent is suﬃciently low (m ≤ m∗) does the coordination problem
for sure lead to Pareto ineﬃcient tax policies. The universal public good, g,
plays an important role in reducing inter-group competition and serves as an
implicit coordination devise that reduces the incentive of each group to relax its
performance standard to get included in the minimum winning coalition.
5.2 Heterogenous Politicians
Politicians diﬀer in many ways and some personal characteristics make for better
leaders than others. As a consequence, politicians may not be perceived as
perfect substitutes by voters, and, if the characteristics of politicians cannot be
21
observed directly before elections, voters face an adverse selection as well as a
moral hazard problem. The simplest way to capture this within our model is
to assume that politicians earn diﬀerent ego rents while in oﬃce and that the
precise value is private information to the politician. Clearly, voters would like
to elect and reelect politicians with a high ego rent since that would enable them
to control them better.23 In order to isolate the impact of the adverse selection
problem associated with heterogenous politicians from the coordination problem
associated with heterogenous voters, we return to the basis specification in which
voters have identical preferences.
We assume that there are two types of politicians: good and bad ones.
The proportion of good politicians is P while the proportion of bad politicians
is 1 − P . Good politicians earn a larger ego rent than bad politicians, i.e.,
0 < mB < mG. Voters cannot observe the type of (new) candidates before
an election but may be able to infer the type of an incumbent politician from
observed policy choices. After each election, voters announce a reelection rule
that specifies what the incumbent most do to get reelected and households form
expectations accordingly. Having observed the actual policy choice, voters and
households update their beliefs about the type of the politician via Bayes rule
and the politician is reappointed or not in the next election.
We are interested in equilibria in which voters have no strict incentive to
deviate from the announced voting strategy after policy has been implemented.
Suppose that voters have somehow learned that the incumbent politician is
of the good type. Then they would very much like to keep him in oﬃce in
the future and ask him to keep capital taxes low. There is just one problem: in
each subsequent election (after voters learned the true identity of the politician),
the challenger is not a perfect substitute for the incumbent. This provides the
23Alternatively, we could assume that politicians diﬀer with regard to how eﬃcient (com-
petent) they are at converting tax revenues into public goods. This would potentially allow
voters to control politicians via the “career concern” mechanism (see, for example, Rogoﬀ,
1990). The idea is that competent politicians have an incentive to signal that they are compe-
tent early in their careers (to get reelected), and voters have an incentive to reelect competent
and dismiss incompetent politicians because they strictly prefer a competent politician to an
incompetent one, even if they expect that all politicians will misbehave in the future. In our
model, all politicians would have an incentive to set τ = 1 irrespectively of competency if
incentives for doing otherwise are not provided by voters. Thus, the “career concern” mech-
anism does not apply directly to the problem at hand, and, for this reason, we focus on the
simpler case with diﬀerent ego rents in the text.
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incumbent with an incentive to expropriate, as he knows that voters would have
an incentive to forgive him (reelect) rather than go through a new search process
to find another good politician. As a result, without the power to commit to
dismiss an under-performing politician of the good type (once identified), a
simple performance standard of the type employed in Proposition 2 is not going
to work: once a good politician is identified, he can and will exploit his position.
The only equilibrium in stationary strategies that is both superior to the
third best and satisfies the “no-commitment requirement” is the one in which
the identity of the incumbent is never revealed. To see this, let τB as the solution
to φ(τB , τB) = βmB1−β . Suppose that voters announce the performance standard
τs = τB every period. The payoﬀ to perpetual compliance for a politician of
type i is
Ci∞ = u(τB, τB) +mi + β
∞X
k=0
βk
£
U(τB, τB) +mi
¤
, for i = B,G. (36)
The payoﬀ associated with a deviation (and resulting loss of oﬃce) is
Di = u(1, τB) +mi + β
∞X
k=0
βkU(τB, τB), for i = B,G. (37)
By definition of τB, we have CB∞ = DB, while CG∞ > DG because mG > mB.
Hence, both types are willing to comply if they can be assured that voters have
no (strict) incentive to deviate from the announced performance standard after
having observed the policy implementation τ I = τB. The critical point is that
voters have no such incentive because they have learned nothing from observing
τI = τB and, for that reason, any challenger is eﬀectively a perfect substitute
for the incumbent and voters are indiﬀerent between reelecting and dismissing.
Importantly, we notice that heterogeneity among politicians does not render
the accountability mechanism useless as a solution to the capital levy problem:
voters can get any politician to do what the “worst” politician is willing to do
in exchange for permanent tenure — and that is in our model better than the
third best.
While learning is not compatible with stationary voting strategies, it is likely
that learning can be supported either by non-stationary voting strategies that
allow more leeway for good politicians once they have been identified or by
introducing trigger-like voting strategies that contingent reelection on the entire
history of policy implementations made by a particular politician (as in Banks
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and Sundaram, 1993, 1998). Exploring these conjectures is an interesting avenue
of future research.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper demonstrates that performance voting can, partly, solve the capital
levy problem. By way of concluding, we highlight some empirical and testable
implications of our analysis. In societies where democratic institutions are not
fully developed, politicians can, by rigging elections in various ways, avoid being
voted out of oﬃce in response to poor performance. Formally, this corresponds
to situations in which the voting strategy has a lower bound, i.e., min η(.) > 0,
and suggests that societies with less well-developed democratic institutions will,
ceteris paribus, have a tendency to resort to expropriating means of taxation.
Similarly, voters may have diﬃculties delivering on their promises in societies
with uncertain election turnout and voter apathy. This implies an upper bound
on what voters can promise to do, i.e., max η(.) < 1, again making it harder for
voters to promote eﬃcient policies. To enhance the eﬀective voice of the elec-
torate, societies may develop specific democratic institutions such as separation
of powers or vote of confidence procedures (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997,
1999). Empirically, there is a great deal of cross-county variation in measures
of political institutions. Of particular interest here is the index of voice and
accountability, constructed by Kaufman et al. (1999). The index ranks coun-
tries according to the quality of their democratic institutions, using indicators
of democratic accountability, freedom of the press, transparency of decision pro-
cedures and so on. Lassen (2001) finds robust evidence that the size of (general)
government is positively related to this index of voice and accountability in a
sample of 62 democracies in 1995. Becker and Mulligan (1998) finds that the
size of government tends to be larger in countries with tax systems that are
more eﬃcient (i.e., introduce less distortions). Our theory predicts a positive
relationship between voice and accountability measures and eﬃcient methods
of taxation, and thus suggests that the size of government might be aﬀected
indirectly by allowing more eﬃcient means of taxation in societies with a well-
developed accountability mechanism. It is of considerable interest to explore
these empirical issues in future research.
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7 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. The second best tax problem is
max
(τt)∞t=1
∞X
t=1
βtU(τ t, τet ) (38)
subject to equations (6)-(8) and the commitment technology (τ t = τet ). Inspec-
tion shows that the problem is equivalent to:
max
τt
U(τ t, τet ) t = 1, 2, .. (39)
where
U(τ t, τet) =
χ (1− τ t)
1+χ
χ
1 + χ + γτ t (1− τ t)
1
χ (40)
The first order condition is
−1 + γ − γχ
τ t
1− τ t
= 0 (41)
with the solution given in equation (11). The second order condition is verified
as − γχ
1
(1−τ)2 < 0.
Without commitment power, the third best tax problem is to solve equation
(38) subject to equations (6)-(8) taking τet as given. This is equivalent to solving
for each t ≥ 1
max
τt
(βR)
1+χ
χ (1− τ t) (1− τet )
1
χ + (βR)
1+χ
χ γτ t (1− τet )
1
χ
or, simplifying
max
τt
1 + (γ − 1) τ t
with the solution τ t = 1¤
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